This was embodied in statute and modified by the Homicide Act 1957, s. 3 which allowed a defence to murder (but a conviction for manslaughter) where a defendant was provoked, suffered a sudden and temporary loss of self-control and the provocation was enough to objectively make . Maria Parmley and Joseph G. Cunningham (2014), She looks Sad, But He Looks Mad: The Effects of Age, Gender, and Ambiguity on Emotion Perception, The Journal of Social Psychology 154(4): 323338. Thus the principle expressed by Ashworth and adopted by Lord Diplock in Camplin prevailed; the law of provocation required a reasonable level of self-control from provoked defendants regardless of any mental abnormalities. Regrettably though, the courts appeared to be inconsistent in this respect. Excellent accounts of the emergence and historical development of the provocation plea can be found in. But, not surprisingly perhaps, the political tide appears to have turned in favour of tougher sentences where the harm is so serious, and as Ashworth rightly suggests, the current guidelines may have to be revised. This, of course, follows the distinction advocated by Lord Diplock and Ashworth in that only characteristics relevant to the provocation should be taken into account. Footnote 1 At the heart of the defence is the idea of 'loss of self-control.' Defendants often describe the experience of losing self-control as one where they 'snap' or 'crack' in response to the provocation, and 'explode' into violence. See John Deigh, On Emotions: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), for a full examination of these issues. Excluding Evidence as Protecting Constitutional or Human Rights? This chapter reviews some of the key elements and concerns about the old common law before turning to explore its statutory replacement. Nine Fallacies in, T Macklem and J Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism (2001) 64 MLR 815, RD Mackay and BJ Mitchell, Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One? [2003] Crim LR 745, J Chalmers, Merging Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism [2004] Crim LR 198, J Gardner and T Macklem, No Provocation without Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay and Mitchell [2004] Crim LR 213. It has already been suggested that this distinction between the old and the new law ought not in fact to make much difference. Communication of revocation can be direct or indirect and can be made by a third party. The difficulty here is that there are no clear objective or scientific data about consistency in levels of self-control. 2. The Law of Provocation - LawTeacher.net From a purely pragmatic perspective it might be suggested that it was enough to leave it to the jury's good sense to decide whether a characteristic was so discreditable that it should not be used to enable the defendant to reduce his liability. Where diminished responsibility is relied on, the burden of proof lies with the defendant and the burden must be discharged on a balance of probabilities;94 whereas it is for the prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt a loss of self-control.95 Clearly, there is a real likelihood that these differences in the burdens and standards of proof will cause considerable difficulties for juries. The Law Commission recommended a restructuring of the substantive law, so that (if successful) provocation would effectively reduce murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree; n 3 above, para 9.6. Nevertheless, there must be a real fear that the retention of the loss of self-control requirement will continue to thwart many deserving cases.